This paper investigates the determinants of group membership, and in particular the e¤ect of income inequality on individual incentives to join economic groups. Drawing on a simple model, we show that an increase in inequality has an ambiguous e¤ect and that the type of access rule (open versus restricted access) is key in determining what income categories are represented in the group. Furthermore, the shape of the income distribution can be crucial to determine whether increased inequality leads to more or less group participation. Using survey data from rural Tanzania we …nd that inequality at the village level has a negative impact on the likelihood that the respondents are members of any group. This e¤ect is particularly signi…cant for relatively wealthier people, both when relative wealth is 'objectively' measured, and when it is 'subjectively' de…ned. However, when we disaggregate groups by type of access rule, we …nd that inequality decreases participation in open access groups when there are wide disparities at the bottom of the distribution, while it increases participation in restricted access groups when the disparities are around the middle and top part of the distribution. Finally, we assess the impact of inequality on various dimensions of group functioning.
Introduction
This paper investigates the determinants of participation in groups, and in particular the e¤ect of heterogeneity on individual incentives to join groups that provide some shared economic bene…ts. The speci…c form of heterogeneity considered is wealth inequality. We address such questions as: Is group participation higher or lower in more unequal communities? When inequality increases, is it the 'poor' or the 'rich' who drop out of the groups? Does this depend on the type of access rule to the group? How are individual incentives a¤ected by the shape of the distribution of wealth (i.e. by the fact that heterogeneity may be concentrated in the lower or in the upper quintiles of the distribution)?
These questions are relevant for a variety of reasons. First of all, they broaden our understanding of the consequences of inequality. Typically, the reasons why we care about income inequality have to do with poverty and with its material consequences.
However, inequality also leads to social tensions and in general places stress on social structures. This paper can shed some light on the social consequences of inequality.
Secondly, but not less importantly, by asking how inequality a¤ects participation in groups this paper explores the determinants of 'social capital', namely of the stock of social norms, trust, and civic networks that characterize a society. Since the work of Putnam (1993) , social capital has been shown to have important economic e¤ects both at the micro and at the macro level. 1 If social capital has indeed such positive economic e¤ects, it becomes important to understand its determinants: why is it that di¤erent communities have di¤erent levels of social capital, and what can economic policy do to a¤ect this stock? Given the di¢culty of measuring such an 'intangible' asset as social capital, our analysis concentrates on one of its most important components, which is particularly straightforward to measure: membership in groups. 1 At the micro level, the role of networks in shaping individual outcomes such as labor supply, welfare participation, criminal activities, and fertility has been studied, among others, by Case and Katz (1991) and by Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000) . At the macro level, Knack and Keefer (1997) have found a positive association between social capital and output growth in a cross section of countries. In the context of developing economies, numerous studies have documented the key role played by community links in solving coordination problems and facilitating economic transactions when markets are missing or incomplete (see, among others, Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990) , Isham, Narayan and Pritchett (1995) , Narayan and Pritchett (1999) ).
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The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. In the theoretical section we present a simple model in which heterogeneous individuals can choose to join a group which provides an excludable good to its members, and we derive predictions on the equilibrium composition of the group and on its size under two alternative access rules. The …rst is one of 'open access', by which anyone can join provided he or she pays the cost. The second rule instead allows the members of the group to exclude someone by majority vote. We show that an increase in income inequality has an ambiguous e¤ect both on group composition and on aggregate levels of participation, and that the type of access rule is key in determining what income categories are represented in the group. In particular, open access groups will be formed by relatively poor individuals, while the composition of restricted access groups will be unbalanced in favor of the relatively rich. We then analyze the impact of increased inequality on participation and show that it depends both on the access rule and on the shape of the income distribution. In particular, aggregate member-
ship decreases under open access when heterogeneity increases in the lower part of the distribution, while participation can actually increase under restricted access if the upper part of the distribution is su¢ciently skewed.
We test the predictions of the theory using survey data on rural households from Tanzania. Our main empirical results are the following.
(i) Higher inequality in assets at the village level has a negative impact on the likelihood that the respondents are members of a group. This result holds when controlling for other kinds of heterogeneity and for the possible endogeneity of inequality.
(ii) Inequality acts di¤erentially on rich and poor people: when inequality increases, it is the relatively richer who drop out of groups, possibly because they have less to gain. The motives behind the decision of the rich to withdraw from groups are explored using both objective and subjective measures of relative wealth. We …nd that, for given 'objective' wealth, those individuals who overestimate their relative rank in the village participate less when inequality increases.
(iii) The impact of inequality on participation depends on the shape of the distribution of wealth and on the access rule to the group. In particular, it is negative for open access groups when there are wide disparities at the bottom of the distribution, while it is positive for restricted access groups when the disparities are around the 2 middle and top part of the distribution.
(iv) Finally, group functioning in more unequal communities displays the following features: decisions are less likely to be taken by vote; members tend to sort into homogeneous income and ethnic groups; they more often report poor group performance and misuse of funds; they interact less frequently, and in general they feel less encouraged to participate. These e¤ects are estimated separately for di¤erent categories of groups.
Relatively little work has been done on this topic. On the empirical side, the determinants of participation in socio-political groups in US cities have been investigated by Di Pasquale and Glaeser (1999) and by Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) . Di
Pasquale and Glaeser …nd that social capital is positively associated with home ownership, while Alesina and La Ferrara …nd that individuals are less likely to join groups in unequal and racially fragmented communities. This paper di¤ers from the above studies in two respects. First, it includes economic groups such as production cooperatives and credit associations, and not only socio-political groups. 2 Secondly, the empirical evidence provided in this paper regards a developing country. Understanding group participation in developing countries is crucial because in those countries groups and networks serve many of the functions that elsewhere are served by formal institutions and market mechanisms (e.g. they provide access to informal insurance, credit, and even jobs).
This paper is also related to the literature on inequality and collective action.
Starting with the seminal contributions by Olson (1965) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) , who predicted, respectively, a positive and a neutral e¤ect of income inequality on public good provision, recent studies have emphasized the possibility that the impact of increased inequality on collective action may indeed be negative.
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Our paper does not study public goods, but something that is closer to the notion of 'club goods'. 4 However, it shares with the above literature the interest in the e¤ects and the workings of inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 brie ‡y describes the data set and comments on the trends in participation and group composition. Section 4 illustrates our empirical strategy. Section 5 contains the main results on the e¤ect of inequality -and of heterogeneity in generalon individuals' decisions to join groups. In section 6, an attempt is made to estimate the impact of inequality on aggregate outcomes at the group level, e.g. on group composition and functioning. The results are presented separately for di¤erent categories of groups, such as economic, religious, and political. Section 7 concludes.
The model
In this section we present a simple model of participation in groups in which the net bene…ts from participation vary with individual wealth. 5 The model studies the impact of increased inequality on individual and aggregate levels of participation, comparing two possible mechanisms of group functioning. First, the 'open access' case, in which whoever wants to join a group is free to do it, provided he or she pays the dues. Second, the 'restricted access' case, in which the admission of a new to the collective goods, the relationship between inequality and e¢ciency will typically be inverse U-shaped. 4 In contrast with club models, where an exclusion mechanism is usually assumed, we will study group composition both when there is excludability and when there is unrestricted access to the group. For a model of jurisdiction formation in which the choice of the admission rule is endogenous, see Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997) . 5 The aim of the model is to highlight one of the possible channels through which income distribution and participation can be related. We study the case in which only one group can form.
This assumption is made because we are interested in understanding the impact of inequality in settings in which individuals with di¤erent wealth cannot perfectly 'segregate' into homogeneous groups. On the other hand, it is not too irrealistic to think that this assumption may apply to some communities (e.g. villages) whose small scale does not allow for the coexistence of many groups of the same type. The extension of our results to the case of multiple groups is discussed in section 2.3.
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individual into a group must be agreed upon by a majority of the members. The key results delivered by the model can be summarized in four points:
i) Overall, inequality has an ambiguous impact on participation. Whether membership decreases or increases when there is more dispersion in wealth levels among the population depends in fact on the access rule and on whether the initial group members have become more or less heterogeneous.
ii) Given that the net bene…ts from participation are assumed to be decreasing in individual wealth, in those cases where membership decreases with inequality we can expect the relatively richer individuals to stay out of the groups when inequality increases.
iii) Under open access, the equilibrium composition of the group contains all the poorest individuals up to a threshold level of wealth. In this case, the e¤ect of inequality depends on the shape of the income distribution at the bottom: if the increased dispersion in wealth makes the individuals below the wealth threshold more heterogeneous, participation will go down.
iv) Under restricted access, group composition is unbalanced in favor of the rich, and the impact of inequality depends on the shape of the income distribution around the mean and the top. In particular, participation can increase with inequality if the 'median voter' in the group becomes richer and wishes to extend membership to decrease his or her share of the costs.
Setup
Consider a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1] and ranked according to their wealth y i so that the poorest individual has index 0 and the richest 1. We denote the initial distribution of wealth by fy i g. Each individual
can choose whether or not to participate in a group that provides an excludable good to its members. This good is consumed in the same (…xed) quantity by all and only the members of the group. Let H be the set of individuals who join the group. The total cost of providing the good is assumed to be …xed and equal to C: This cost is covered through a proportional tax on members' wealth: 6 6 All our qualitative results hold under a more general tax schedule t(i), as long as t(¢) is strictly increasing in i. While particularly convenient from an analytical point of view, the assumption of a
The tax rate is assumed to be exogenous and, from the above expression, is decreasing in the size of the group and in the wealth of the participants:
In order to abstract from the free-rider problem, we assume that individual wealth is observable and that whoever does not pay the fee ty i cannot have access to the good provided by the group. Also, in what follows we exclude the possibility of side payments among individuals.
Everyone has the same preferences over the good provided by the group, represented by the continuous utility function u(¢). We assume that the quality of the good is the same for every member and is decreasing in the size of the group, say because of congestion. Let H indicate the size of the group, with a slight abuse of notation. We assume that the 'reduced form' utility function over group size, u(H);
is continuously di¤erentiable and that
Assumption (A1) says that the utility derived from joining the group decreases at an increasing rate with group size. 8 Any individual who does not join the group gets a reservation utility u(0)´u¸0.
Total utility depends on group size and on income net of payments to the group, so that for an individual j who does (or does not) join the group, total utility is, respectively: 9 proportional tax can be motivated, for example, by the existence of informational contraints which prevent the use of more complex tax schemes. In section 2.3 we will discuss the consequences of the adoption of a lump-sum tax instead of a proportional tax. 7 For a model in which the tax rate is endogenously determined by voting, see Roberts (1977) . 8 In general, we can think that initially there may be utility gains, rather than losses, from having more people in the group, and that congestion would take place only beyond a certain group size.
We choose to ignore this possibility and to incorporate all positive e¤ects if increased group size through the cost reduction channel. 9 Both the assumption that u(H) is independent of i and the assumption that the reservation
We can now consider the equilibrium group size and composition under two alternative regimes.
Open access group
The …rst regime is one in which anyone is allowed to join the group, with or without the consent of the other members. We will call this the 'open access' group. In this case, the equilibrium size of the group must be self-enforcing, in the sense that all and only the individuals who obtain a positive net bene…t from participating are in the group. This is captured in our de…nition of an open access (OA) equilibrium:
De…nition 1 A group H is an OA equilibrium if the following two conditions hold:
(i) no j 2 H wishes to leave H;
(ii) no j = 2 H wishes to join H.
The above de…nition amounts to saying that group H will be formed by all and only the individuals j for whom the following participation constraint is satis…ed:
Proposition 2 In an OA equilibrium the group is formed by the poorest [0; h ¤ ] individuals, where h ¤ is the largest root of the equation:
utility u is the same for everyone may seem unrealistic. For the sake of parsimony, we choose to concentrate all wealth e¤ects in the cost of participation, ty i , but we could obtain analogous results by letting the gross bene…ts from participation and/or the outside option vary across individuals with di¤erent wealth. All we really need in the following analysis is some monotone relationship between the bene…t from participation in excess of individual contribution and reservation utility on the one hand, and individual wealth on the other.
Proof : Unless otherwise stated, all proofs are in appendix A.
In what follows we will often refer to h ¤ as the 'marginal' member. Proposition 1 is a consequence of the fact that, when individual contributions increase with wealth, the net utility from participation is higher for the poorer members than for the richer ones. In fact the bene…t from a given level of congestion is the same for everyone (…rst addendum on the left hand side of (3)), while the cost is higher for richer people (second addendum). There is a threshold level h ¤ beyond which the burden of …nancing group activities would be too heavy for the richest individuals to bear, and they prefer to stay out of the group. All we need to know to predict group size is then the identity of the last richest member, which is the h ¤ solution of (4).
Restricted access group
Consider now the case where the members can regulate access to the group, e¤ectively preventing someone from joining or expelling a member they no longer want. We will maintain the assumption that the act of joining must be voluntary, i.e. the group can decrease its size without the consent of the involved party, but cannot increase it unless the new member agrees to join. Decisions within the group are taken by majority rule. Note that since for given group size individual preferences are strictly monotone in individual wealth, the member with median wealth is decisive. The extensive form of the game can be described as follows. 4b_2. If any member of H 1 refuses to join, the original H 0 is reinstated.
5. Taxes are levied on the members of the …nal group (be it H 0 or H 1 ), the good is provided to them, and the game ends. 10 We are not interested in how the original group is formed. One can think for example of a random draw by nature, both in terms of size and of composition of the group.
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We next de…ne our equilibrium concept under this restricted access (RA) regime.
De…nition 3
A group H 0 is a RA equilibrium if the following two conditions hold:
(i) no j 2 H 0 wishes to leave H 0 ;
(ii) H 1´H0 , i.e. given the initial size and composition of the group, the median wealth member does not propose to alter it.
The following consideration can help understand our de…nition of a RA equilibrium. Note that any median member would always like to expel the bottom half wealth members of an initial group H 0 and include richer people in their place, i.e.
shift the composition of the group to the right: this way congestion could be maintained the same and taxes decreased. In this e¤ort, he would always be supported by the majority (the top half members). An equilibrium is reached when the size and composition of the group is such that: all the members get a higher utility from staying in the group than from leaving (condition (i) in the de…nition); and no richer individual beyond the current top wealth member would agree to join the group, so it is not pro…table for the median member to propose a change (condition (ii) in the de…nition). Alternatively, an RA equilibrium can be seen as the group chosen by a median member who maximizes his or her utility across the set of groups all of which will have him or her as a member.
Notice that in this framework the median member is given one chance to alter the composition of the group and then the game ends. In other words, the median member does not have to worry about the fact that, if group composition shifts right, in the following period he or she will no longer be 'median' and the new decisive individual may choose to move even more to the right, so that eventually the utility of the original median voter may be lower than under the initial con…guration. While more satisfactory from a dynamic point of view, the latter approach would yield a larger set of equilibria. We choose therefore to adopt the seemingly more 'myopic' game structure described in the text in order to get sharper predictions on the equilibrium outcome. This way we obtain a '…xed point' type of equilibrium, in which group size and composition are optimal for the median member even if he or she were free to alter it without risking 'unraveling' in the future. In the terminology of Roberts (1999), who develops a fully dynamic framework for voting equilibria in clubs, we are restricting our attention to an 'extrinsic' steady state.
Lemma 4
Any group that is a RA equilibrium must be a single interval. 
The solution to the problem is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 5
Depending on the functional form of u(¢) and on the wealth distribution fy i g, in equilibrium the group can take one of two forms:
where¸¸0 is the multiplier on the participation constraint (6). 11 Notice that in (6) we only write one constraint, namely that for the richest member h 2 . In fact given that the net utility from joining the group is strictly decreasing in y j for given group size, if the participation constraint holds for h 2 , it will necessarily hold for any
Case A describes an equilibrium in which the group is formed by the richest segment of the population. In case B, instead, both the low and the top end of the wealth scale are out of the group, the former because they are not allowed to join (though they would like to), and the latter because they choose not to (the tax burden is relatively too high for them). Compared to the OA equilibrium, the possibility to exclude people from the group generates a composition unbalanced in favor of the rich. A poor member is always less desirable than a rich one because it generates the same congestion and contributes less resources.
Income distribution, group composition and size
Starting from the initial wealth distribution fy i g, we now consider the e¤ects of an increase in inequality taking the form of a redistribution of wealth from the poor to the rich. In particular, we assume that the new wealth distribution fe y i g has the following characteristics: In the present context, in which only one group is formed, the aggregate level of participation coincides with group size. Will participation, as measured by group size, be higher or lower under the more unequal distribution of income? 12 Of these assumptions, only (A4) is really needed, while (A5) and (A6) could be dispensed with. Suppose in fact that individual ranking under fe y i g changed compared to that under fy i g.
In this case, the arguments provided below could be applied in the same way by simply re-sorting individuals in ascending wealth order and studying whether the individual that under the new distribution occupies the 'marginal position' h (or h
is richer or poorer than before.
Inequality under open access
When anyone is free to join the group, the impact of increased inequality is described by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Let h ¤ be the solution to (4) . An increase in inequality taking the form described in (A4)-(A6) will decrease participation if and only if
Corollary 7 If (11) holds, the group that forms under fe y i g is constituted by the
Intuitively, the condition expressed in proposition 4 requires the relative increase (decrease) in the wealth of the marginal member h ¤ to be larger (smaller) than the cumulative change in the wealth of the poorer members. We have seen, in fact, that each individual's incentive to join the group depends on his or her relative wealth vis-a-vis that of the other participants. Consider the case in which individual h ¤ is richer under the new wealth distribution, i.e. e y h ¤ > y h ¤ . In this case, (11) holds unambiguously because the right-hand side is less than unity by construction.
Individual h ¤ is now 'too rich', and the other members 'too poor', for h ¤ to bene…t from participation.
If, on the other hand, e y h ¤ < y h ¤ , it can be pro…table for h ¤ to belong to the group as long as he or she has become su¢ciently poor and e y h ¤ is close to that of the rest of the individuals in [0; h ¤ ), as depicted for example in …gure 1a. In this case group size may actually increase with inequality, because the many people who have become poor get comparable bene…ts from participation and can gain by extending membership to decrease per-capita costs. Conversely, if e y h ¤ < y h ¤ but (11) holds, as depicted for example in …gure 1b, participation will be lower under the new distribution of wealth.
[Insert …gure 1]
To sum up, under open access an increase in wealth inequality has an ambiguous e¤ect on group size. Roughly speaking, the e¤ect is negative if the redistribution leads to more inequality in the bottom part of the distribution; it can be positive if the redistribution bene…ts few rich people at the expense of a large mass of poor people so that there is relatively more equality at the bottom of the distribution.
In all instances, if participation does decrease, it is the relatively richer members who choose to drop out. In the empirical section of this work, we will test all these implications.
Inequality under restricted access
When access to the group can be regulated by its members, the e¤ect of inequality on participation is even more ambiguous. In what follows we discuss the results qualitatively. The formal analysis for case A is relegated to appendix A. ; 1] is higher. This means that, if group size stayed the same, the tax rate required to cover the cost C would now be lower. Loosely speaking 14 , if the 13 If there are multiple equilibria, the conditions we derive on the impact of inequality on participation must be intended to hold locally around each of the equilibria. In appendix A, however, we show that, under mild su¢cient conditions on the shape of the wealth distribution, the RA equilibrium type A is unique, hence for that case our conclusions hold globally.
A formal treatment of case B is not reported due to the large number of possibilities arising from the fact that in case B nothing can be said a priori on the aggregate wealth of group members under the new versus the old distribution of income. For this case, we therefore choose to give a qualitative account of the possible ambiguities. 14 Notice that in general the individual who was the median member under the initial wealth distribution will no longer be the median member under fe y i g. All we say in what follows should be read as saying that if the same individual were still median, he or she would no longer be optimizing by choosing the same group size, hence group size must change, in one direction or the other. 
This implies that if the group remained as before, the tax rate should be higher and, unless h ¤¤ 2 had become substantially poor and 'close' to the other members in wealth, his or her net utility would fall below u. Under such circumstances, we would expect the relatively richer members to drop out and group composition to shift left.
To sum up, in the RA equilibrium an increase in inequality may either increase or decrease participation. Furthermore, in contrast with the OA case in which any decrease in group size happens with the richer members dropping out, in the RA case it can be the rich or the poor who leave the group, depending on the shape of the distribution of wealth.
Discussion and extensions
The analysis so far has assumed that only one group can form. A …rst question is whether our results generalize to the case where multiple groups can coexist. In this section we brie ‡y address this question at the qualitative level. What makes the multiple groups setting interesting is the possibility that more inequality actually leads to an increase in participation by increasing the equilibrium number of groups.
In fact from the local public …nance -multicommunity literature we know that when heterogeneous agents can choose among multiple 'jurisdictions' they will stratify into homogeneous income groups (e.g. Epple and Romer (1991), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) ). While we can expect the results here obtained for a single group to hold within each of the multiple groups, it is possible to get contradicting results in the aggregate. Take for example the open access case, in which N groups will form starting at 0 until some wealth level h beyond which no individual is part of any group. 15 In this case an increase in inequality will shift the composition of each group to the left, and this may 'free up' some of the richer members so they can form an N + 1th group including some j > h. Aggregate participation may in this case be higher, rather than lower, even in the open access case.
Another assumption in the above analysis was that members paid a proportional tax on income. This had two implications. The …rst was that anyone could sustain the costs of joining a group, because by de…nition only a fraction of their income was taken. The second was that for the whole group a richer individual was preferable to a poor one, because he or she contributed more. This generated our 'sorting' result.
Suppose instead that group activities were …nanced through an exogenous lump-sum tax, T . In this case a new constraint should be added to the problem, namely that every member i of a group of size H can a¤ord paying the dues: y i¸T = C=H. In the open access -single group case our result that the group is formed by the poorest [0; h ¤ ] individuals would no longer hold. First of all, the very poorest individuals may not be able to a¤ord the costs of participation. Second, within the set of individuals whose income exceeds T no prediction could be made on who exactly would join the group. All the model could determine is an equilibrium group size at which the net utility for any member exactly equals the reservation level u: In this case the presence of heterogeneity in preferences and/or in individual outside options would deliver predictions on who should have an incentive to join.
16 15 The reason we can get multiple groups under open access, without all poor individuals ‡ocking to the richest group, is that there is a trade o¤ between size and tax rates. In other words, if the equilibrium size of the groups increases as we move from 0 to h, the marginal member of the poorest group, say h 1 , may be indi¤erent between staying in group 1 with high taxes and low congestion, and joining the immediately richer group 2 which has a lower tax rate and more congestion. 16 For example, if individual outside options u i were increasing in i, we could still predict that
Regarding the decision process in the restricted access model, we have made the assumption 'one head one vote'. Realistically, in many groups the relatively richer individuals may have greater in ‡uence (direct or indirect) on the decisions. If this feature were incorporated in our analysis, it would reinforce the possibility that an increase in inequality leads to an increase of participation, thus accentuating the di¤erence between the OA and the RA equilibria.
Finally, we choose to disregard the possibility that altruism may a¤ect individual decisions to join groups (or to admit people into a group). Any assumption in this direction would of course a¤ect our results.
The data
In what follows we turn to the empirical analysis to try and shed light on some of the ambiguities present in the theory and to test the predictions of the model. The data we use come from two surveys conducted by the World Bank: the Tanzania Social Where useful to remedy the incomplete coverage of the SCPS, this coincidence will be the group will be formed by an interval [h 0 ; h ¤ ], where the lower bound h 0 is de…ned by the budget constraint y h0 = C=(h ¤ ¡ h 0 ) and the upper bound h ¤ is de…ned by the indi¤erence condition
In this case, it is still true that if participation decreases when inequality increases, it is the relatively richer people who stay out of the group. The introduction of a lump-sum tax modi…es the analysis of the RA group in a more substantial way, because it is no longer true that the median voter would be made better o¤ by a one time shift in the composition of the group to the right. Enriching the model with the possibility of idiosyncratic income shocks, a limited liability argument may push in the direction that a rich individual is relatively more 'desirable' than a poor one because he or she has a higher probability of being able to pay the fee in the event of an adverse shock.
exploited. In this section, some descriptive statistics from the SCPS will be presented to gain some insight into the di¤usion and characteristics of associational activity in our sample.
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[ Insert table 1] According to the SCPS, 72 percent of the individuals in the sample were members of some group, the average number of groups per participant being 1.6. Table 1 lists the main types of groups, reporting the percentage of the total sample who belong to the given group(s). We will classify the various groups under three broad categories:
(i) religious, such as churches (joined by 15% of the respondents), Muslim groups and mosques (6%); (ii) political (12%); and (iii) economic, including burial societies (12%), women's groups (5%), farmers' groups (5%), cooperatives (2%), rotating credit associations (1%), and dairy/cattle rearing groups (1%). The characteristics of the di¤erent groups can be described with the help of table 2.
[Insert when there is a fee and members do not pay it, chances of being expelled are high for political and economic groups (about 40%), while almost 80% of the members of religious associations report that nothing happens.
In panel B we turn to the degree of heterogeneity of the members in terms of ethnic identity, type of economic activity, and income level. 18 Regarding the ethnic composition of the groups, in the vast majority of the cases group membership is open to anyone: only for economic groups, 7% of the respondents say that the members all belong to the same clan or tribe. 19 Group members are also diverse in the type of activity from which they earn their living. Approximately 78 to 87 percent of the respondents consider the groups 'mixed' under this respect. Again, only for economic groups the fraction reporting that 'all' ('most') members make a living in the same way is signi…cant, namely 7% (14%). In a separate question, the same individuals were asked whether the leaders of the groups made a living in a di¤erent way from the rest of the members: in this case, 32 to 34 percent of the people answered 'yes'.
Finally, all groups seem to aggregate people with di¤erent income levels: only 1% of the respondents reported that the members were all rich or all poor, and 15 to 29 percent -depending on the type of group-said that there was little income diversity among the participants.
Overall, the evidence reported in panel B seems to suggest that the individuals in our sample do not sort into highly homogeneous groups. At least in principle, therefore, there is scope for di¤erential incentive mechanisms among relatively rich and relatively poor people, as stressed by the theory.
Empirical strategy
The structural equations underlying our estimates can be presented as follows. The expected net bene…t from participation for individual i in village v is: 18 This data di¤ers from the measures of heterogeneity we will use in the multivariate analysis under two respects: (i) the …gures in table 2 refer to heterogeneity within the group, while in our regressions we will link participation to heterogeneity in the whole village (as requested by the theory); (ii) the data in table 2 comes from individual responses to questions directly aimed at assessing homogeneity among group members. In the multivariate analysis, on the contrary, we will construct measures of heterogeneity starting from the primitives, i.e. from raw data on individual ethnicity, education, economic activity, income and assets. 19 The relative importance of ethnic a¢liation for this category of groups compared to the others is not surprising, given that tribal links can enlarge the scope for reciprocity and enforcement mechanisms in economic transactions (see e.g. La Ferrara (1997)).
where X iv is a vector of individual characteristics, such as age, sex, education, and wealth; H v is a vector of village characteristics, such as average wealth, heterogeneity in education, in economic activity, and in tribe; G v measures assets inequality in village v, and " iv is an error term normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ¾ v :
The vectors¯;°and ± are parameters. We do not observe the 'latent' variable B ¤ iv , but only the choice made by the individual, which takes value 1 (participate) if the expected net bene…t is positive, and 0 (not participate) otherwise:
The probit model (12)-(13) will be estimated, correcting for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the village level. 20 To account for the possibility of endogeneity or measurement error in our inequality variable, we will then estimate a linear probability model and instrument inequality using geographical variables. The two-stage-least-squares model estimated is in this case:
where P iv is equal to 1 if individual i in village v is member of some group and 0 otherwise; X iv ; H v and G v are as above; X v contains village level averages for the variables X iv ; Z v is a vector of instruments; …nally,¯;°; ±; ¹; Ã;¸are vectors of parameters. The variable G v is thus estimated as in (15) and its predicted value 20 Strictly speaking, the equations in (13) refer to open access groups, because it is in those groups that the individual choice to participate is purely 'demand driven', i.e. only depends on perceived net bene…ts B ¤ iv . For restricted access groups, membership depends both on individual willingness to join and on acceptance on behalf of the group. However, given that under the assumptions of our theory acceptance by the group should depend on the applicant's characteristics and on community characteristics, the reduced form for RA groups can also be reconducted to model (12)- (13) . substituted into (14) , correcting the standard errors. The key assumption for the two stage estimation of this linear probability model is that Z v is correlated with G v but uncorrelated with " iv :
We will also estimate model (12)-(13) separately for 'relatively rich' and 'relatively poor' individuals, to see if the coe¢cient on inequality, ±, di¤ers among the two subsamples. Regarding the role of the shape of the income distribution under di¤erent access rules, we will test the predictions of our model by estimating model (12)- (13) separately for OA and RA groups, and using inequality measures with varying degrees of sensitivity to the lower vs. upper part of the income distribution.
Finally, the last part of our empirical analysis will explore some issues not directly linked to the model presented in this paper, but which we …nd worth investigating given the richness of the data set. In particular, we will examine how inequality relates to relevant group characteristics, namely group composition and functioning.
Summary statistics for all variables are reported in appendix B. Table 3 presents our estimates of the basic model. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent -generally the head of the household-is member of at least one group. The individual controls include: age, sex, and education of the respondent; household size, and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has been living in the same village at least for the past ten years. Individual wealth is measured through an 'asset index' constructed in the survey by assigning predetermined weights to the ownership of various durable consumption goods. 21 The average of this index at the village level, as well as the 'size' of the village in terms of population, are included among the regressors to control for potential di¤erences in the 'demand' for participation across communities. Regional dummies are also included. 21 The durable consumption goods and weights used were the following: van or truck, car, motorcycle, bicycle, sewing machine = 16, radio = 8, table = 6, bed, clock or watch = 4, chair = 3, lamp = 2. If the asset was not working, these weights were approximately halved.
Inequality and group membership

Basic regressions
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The explanatory variables in which we are most interested are measures of heterogeneity among residents in the village, and in particular:
i) inequality, measured with the Gini coe¢cient built from the assets index of all respondents from the village; 22 ii) tribal fragmentation, measured through the following 'fractionalization' index:
where s kv is the share of respondents in village v who belong to tribe k, and in each village there is a number K v of di¤erent tribes. This index represents the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the same village belong to di¤erent tribes;
iii) heterogeneity in economic activity, measured with an index analogous to (16) , where k denotes an individual's economic activity rather than tribe; 23 iv) heterogeneity in education, measured as the standard deviation of the highest grade in school obtained by household heads interviewed in the village.
[Insert table 3]
The …rst column of table 3 presents the baseline speci…cation of our probit model, including individual and village controls but not heterogeneity measures. The age and sex of the respondent do not seem to matter very much, while education has a positive and signi…cant impact on the probability of being member of a group.
Household size and the length of residence in the village do not have a signi…cant impact on participation. On the other hand, the size of the community in terms of population has a negative e¤ect on participation rates, though not always statistically 22 The choice of assets inequality as opposed to expenditure or land inequality is motivated by several considerations. First, compared to income inequality, inequality in assets is likely to be less endogenous, and a better measure of permanent inequality in the village. Second, the only land variable in the HRDS is the number and size of shambas (or gardens) owned by a household, which does not necessarily capture di¤erences in wealth. For example, an individual who solely relies on farm labor and cultivates two shambas should not be considered richer than a government employee who may not own a shamba. Finally, the Gini coe¢cient built from assets displays much more variation than that built from expenditure or from land. 23 The most common activities are: working on own farm, government employee, self-employed, and retired.
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signi…cant at conventional levels. Average wealth in the village is positively associated with group membership, suggesting that participation may be a 'normal good'.
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In column 2 we introduce various measures of heterogeneity at the village level.
Neither tribal fractionalization nor heterogeneity in education turn out to be significant in our regression. The diversity of economic activities is also not signi…cant:
one possible reason is that there is not much variation in this variable: almost 84 percent of the respondents belong to the same category, i.e. 'farmers'. On the contrary, the estimated coe¢cient on Gini is negative and signi…cant at the 1 percent level: increased inequality in one's village has a negative e¤ect on the likelihood that somebody will join a group. Based on the marginal coe¢cients of the probit model in table 3, an increase in Gini by one standard deviation decreases the probability of participating in a group by about 4 percentage points. This is quite a sizeable e¤ect if compared to the other determinants of participation: for example, it is almost three times the e¤ect of one more year of education.
In the last two columns we consider non linear e¤ects of individual income on participation. This is partly to verify that our results on inequality are not a statistical artifact. 25 We can see from column 3 that, when we introduce individual assets and its square, Gini retains a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient. The coe¢cients on individual assets suggest that the relationship between individual wealth and participation is increasing and concave. Finally, in column 4 we further explore nonlinearities by introducing two dummies that indicate whether the respondent belongs to the …rst or the last wealth quartile. We …nd that they have, respectively, a negative and a positive coe¢cient, though not highly signi…cant. On the other hand, the coe¢cient on inequality is quite robust and fairly stable in all these speci…cations. 24 We must be careful in interpreting this link in a causal sense, given that higher wealth in the community might be a consequence (rather than a cause) of higher levels of social capital (see Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) . 25 In fact, if the relationship between individual income and group participation were concave and we omitted nonlinear income terms from the speci…cation, we may …nd a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient on Gini even if inequality per se were not a determinant of participation. In this case, adding nonlinear income terms to the regression should wipe out the e¤ect of inequality. This point has been discussed in the health economics literature when assessing the impact of income inequality on health outcomes (see Gravelle (1998)). 22 
Instrumenting Gini
Before proceeding with more speci…c tests of our theory, we need to deal with the potential endogeneity of the variable Gini. One may conjecture that a high degree of participation may reduce inequality by generating opportunities of advancement for the poor in terms of education, di¤usion of information, public good provision, etc. Also, villages prone to social activities may have higher levels of risk-sharing, which would attenuate the di¤erences in expenditure among their members (though this would be less of a concern if we had a reliable measure of permanent wealth).
Finally, we want to account for the possibility of measurement error in the variable
Gini.
To address the above problems, we estimate a linear probability model using twostage-least-squares, and instrumenting Gini with the following geographic variables:
(i) the average precipitation in the 'critical month(s)', i.e. in those months of the growing season in which scarcity of rain can jeopardize the harvest the most. 26 Given that agriculture is the main activity in rural Tanzania, we expect to …nd a negative relationship between this measure of rain and inequality in the village;
(ii) rainfall variability, i.e. the standard deviation of the monthly precipitation during the year. The higher this variability, the more vulnerable to shocks should be people who rely on farming to earn a living, hence the higher inequality;
(iii) average temperature during the year (in C degrees);
(iv) temperature variability, i.e. the standard deviation of monthly temperature;
(v) median distance of village households from the livestock market;
(vi) median distance of village households from the market for farm products;
(vii) a dummy for villages located in touristic areas, e.g. Kilimanjaro or other national parks, which plausibly have prospects for higher earnings by a few people.
The 2SLS estimated coe¢cient on Gini is -.43 (not too di¤erent from the one obtained without instrumentation), with a standard error of .26. The Hausman test 26 The critical months were identi…ed by looking at the patterns of rain in the di¤erent regions, e.g. unimodal versus bimodal (Gommes and Houssiau (1982) ), and by checking the calendars for the relevant crops. The only year for which we could …nd monthly precipitation data minute by minute is 1987. Despite the lag between the year of the social capital survey and 1987, the latter is recognized as a 'typical' year in terms of precipitation (Gommes and Petrassi, 1994) , and should therefore be adequate to relate to 'permanent' wealth as measured by asset ownership.
fails to reject the joint null of weak exogeneity and no measurement error in Gini (p-value is .97), and according to the Sargan overidenti…cation test our instruments are valid (p-value of .17). 27 This seems to suggest that our concerns about reverse causation and measurement error are not warranted empirically. In row 1 we start by considering individual rank in the wealth scale as 'objectively' de…ned by their asset ownership. For each village we compute wealth quintiles, and we split the sample between those individuals who belong to the bottom two quintiles (column 1), and those who belong to the top three ones (column 2). As we can see from the table, inequality has a negative and signi…cant impact on participation for the latter category of individuals, but not for the former. Our interpretation of this result is that the economic gains from participation are asymmetric and that when inequality increases, so that low-income households become poorer and high-income ones become richer, the latter have less to gain from joining a group. This is quite 27 The adjusted R square in the …rst stage regression is :61, the …rst stage F statistic is F (22; 25) = 1:77 and its p-value is :08. Now let those individuals face the same increase in inequality in their village. Our results suggest that the decision to participate in a group by the individual who considers himself below average will not be signi…cantly a¤ected, while that of the other will be negatively a¤ected. Our interpretetion is that the divergence in their reaction to increased inequality may be due to the conviction that richer people have less to 28 This evidence is consistent with other empirical studies of the determinants of collective action (e.g. Gaspart, Jabbar, Melard and Platteau (1998)), which show that participation -in the form of labor contribution to the provision of a public good-is higher for those individuals who can expect to bene…t relatively more from the public good. 29 The group evaluation process is described in Narayan (1997), ch.2. For an empirical analysis of the determinants of subjective welfare, see Ravallion and Lokshin (1999).
Di¤erential impact of inequality for the rich and the poor
gain from participating in groups with poorer people.
To investigate this hypothesis more in depth, we explore the subjective dimension of inequality by comparing an individual's own perception of his or her rank with the perception that the community has of that individual. In particular, we build a measure of 'subjective overestimation' subtracting the 1-5 score assigned to each respondent by the evaluation group from the score self-assigned by the respondent. A positive value of this variable indicates that the respondent perceives him or herself richer than the community does, and vice versa for a negative value. In row 3 we repeat our estimates splitting the sample between people who underestimate or correctly rank themselves (column 1), and people who overestimate themselves (column 2). We can see from the table that the negative e¤ect of inequality on participation only holds for those people who overestimate their rank. Again, given that we are controlling for 'objective' asset ownership, this result may suggest that individuals who overestimate their rank believe that when inequality increases they will be relatively richer than the other potential members of the group and will have less to gain, hence they stay out of the group.
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Overall, the results in table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that an individual's decision to join a group depends on the expected net bene…ts from participation, and that the way these bene…ts change with inequality depends on the individual's rank in the wealth scale, de…ned both 'objectively' and 'subjectively'. The plausibility of this interpretation will be reinforced in section 6, where the analysis is conducted separately for di¤erent kinds of groups from which rich and poor people have di¤erent bene…ts.
Skewedness of the income distribution and access rules
We next investigate the relationship between the shape of the distribution of wealth and the impact of inequality under di¤erent access rules. In the top panel of table 5, 30 Another possible interpretation is that the selection into either sub-sample is endogenous, e.g.
it is because they are not part of any group that the wealth of individuals belonging to the second sub-sample is underestimated by the evaluation team. In order for this objection to be compelling, one should argue that the bias in the team's evaluation of those who are not members of any group is systematically in the direction of underestimating their wealth. However, it is very likely that such a bias, if it exists, would go in the opposite direction. 
Inequality and group characteristics
Finally, we address the question of whether inequality is systematically associated with certain characteristics of the groups, both in terms of composition and in terms of functioning. Table 6 presents the probit marginal coe¢cients from a set of regressions of various group characteristics on assets inequality, controlling for average assets in the village, heterogeneity in schooling and in economic activity, and tribal fractionalization. Leaving aside for the moment the last two columns, each row in the table refers to a di¤erent dependent variable (all dummies, listed on the left), and each column to a di¤erent type of group (listed on top). Each cell in columns 1 to 6 therefore reports the coe¢cient on Gini from a separate regression.
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The types of groups considered are: religious (church, mosque, or Muslim group), political, and …ve of the most widespread 'economic' groups: burial societies, women groups, farmers' associations, cooperatives and rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs). Burial societies are essentially a means of pooling resources to organize and pay for unexpected expenses such as funerals. There is in general only one burial society in a village, so that if rich and poor people want to participate, they will be members of the same society. While there are no fees, all members are supposed to pay and provide labor when someone dies. For this reason, we can think that poor people have relatively more to gain than rich people from being members in a burial society. Women groups can serve a variety of functions. Some of them are essentially political organizations, others serve religious or social purposes, others 31 A similar pattern emerges when a single index is used (e.g. the Generalized Entropy or the Atkinson index) varying the values of the parameters. 32 In general, the questions on group composition and functioning of the di¤erent groups were asked only to those individuals who reported that they were members of those particular groups.
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still serve economic functions. Among these are microenterprise activities such as tree planting, beer brewing, and credit provision. Again, the possibility to take part in this kind of activities is relatively less appealing for people at the top end of the income scale. Farmers' associations deal with agricultural production and fertilizers, and as such can comprise both rich and poor members. Finally, cooperatives and
ROSCAs serve the usual functions described in the literature.
[ Insert table 6] The top half of table 6 shows the impact of inequality on group composition. In villages with higher inequality group members are generally more likely to belong to the same clan or tribe (row 1). They are also more likely to make a living in the same way (row 2) and less likely to be from a mixed income group (row 4),
suggesting that when inequality increases people tend to sort into more homogeneous groups. It should be noted that these e¤ects are signi…cant in particular for burial societies, women groups, cooperatives and ROSCAs, i.e. those groups where the 'rich' have less to gain if the rest of the members become 'poorer'. For these groups the likelihood that the "members are all poor" is in fact higher the higher the inequality in the village (row 5). These …ndings are consistent with the interpretation on the di¤erential impact of inequality for rich and poor people given above.
In the bottom half of table 6 group composition is taken as given and the question asked is: does higher inequality harm the functioning of a group in any way? Various aspects of group functioning are considered. First of all, in more unequal communities people are less likely to respond that decisions are taken by vote (row 6). There seems to be a tendency towards hierarchic decision-making, especially in those groupspolitical and farmers' associations-where both rich and poor members coexist. This is of particular interest when evaluating the e¤ect of inequality on 'participation' because, although this e¤ect may not show up as a decrease in raw membership numbers, the nature of the groups may still be not very 'participatory'. Also, when inequality is higher members feel less "encouraged to participate" (row 7), again especially in religious and political groups, where members with di¤erent levels of wealth coexist.
When asked to evaluate the functioning of their groups, people living in villages with higher inequality are less likely to report that it is "good" or "excellent" (row 8), although this relationship is statistically signi…cant only for religious and political groups. Members of political groups tend to report that the disadvantage from participating in the group is that they are "misinformed" (row 9) when inequality is higher, consistently with the less democratic decision process noted above. On the other hand, for members of burial societies and women groups the main disadvantage seems to be bad economic management (row 10), e.g. misappropriation of funds by some member or unpro…table activities.
In villages with more income disparities, the likelihood that membership has increased in the past four years (row 11) is lower, which may be seen as an implicit assessment of bad performance. Finally, in more unequal areas groups themselves interact less frequently (row 12). The fact that the negative impact of inequality on many aspects of group functioning is especially signi…cant for burial societies and women groups is of particular concern because it reveals a potentially perverse e¤ect of inequality on groups that are already comprised of low-income individuals.
Columns 7 and 8 repeat the same exercise aggregating the single groups according to their access regime (open or restricted). For each regression, the coe¢cient on Gini is allowed to di¤er depending on whether the group is OA or RA. 33 Interestingly, when the dependent variable regards group composition (rows 1 to 5), higher inequality leads to increased homogeneity in RA more than in OA groups, and the di¤erence between the two coe¢cients is signi…cant at less than 5 percent level in all but one case. This is consistent with the idea that exclusion rules allow members of RA groups to form a relatively homogeneous crowd, while OA groups do not manage to achieve much sorting. On the other hand, when the dependent variable refers to group functioning (rows 6 to 12) the negative impact of inequality is more pronounced for OA groups, and the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant in the case of decision making, participation, perceived good functioning, and sharing of information. In other words, when groups are not sorted by wealth, heterogeneity seems to harm group functioning 33 More precisely, we estimate the following equation
igv is the latent variable underlying the probit model for the characteristic of group g reported by individual i in village v; H v and G v represent, respectively, village characteristics and the Gini coe¢cient computed from assets, as in equation (12) . The novelty is the dummy I g which is equal to 1 if group g is 'open access' and 0 otherwise. The coe¢cients ± OA and ± RA therefore capture the impact of inequality on the group characteristic listed by row separately for OA and RA groups. 30 more than when exclusion rules are available.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to understand the determinants of group membership and how groups function by looking at the role of heterogeneity, and in particular of wealth inequality. Using household level data from rural Tanzania, we have shown that people living in villages with higher inequality are less likely to be members of groups, and that this e¤ect is more pronounced for relatively wealthier individuals. The shape of the distribution of wealth and the type of access rule to the group are also crucial factors a¤ecting the relationship between inequality and participation. Finally, more dispersion in wealth levels seems to be associated with more homogeneity in group composition and with 'negative' outcomes in terms of group functioning. Though far from de…nitive, the evidence presented seems certainly suggestive and calls for a deeper investigation of the mechanisms through which heterogeneity and inequality a¤ect individual incentives to participate in groups. [27] Wade, R., 1988. Village Republics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Appendix A Proof of proposition 1
The …rst part of the proposition says that the group is formed by an interval of people, and in particular by the poorest [0; h] individuals. This follows from the fact that, for given group size, the left-hand side of (3) is decreasing in y j , hence in j.
Therefore if (3) is satis…ed for some j 2 (0; 1), then it must be satis…ed for all j 0 < j.
The second part of the proposition gives the 'identity' of the richest individual in the group, i.e. the value of h for which the participation constraint is binding.
Whether the solution to (4) is unique depends on the functional form of u(¢), as well as on the distribution of y i : We can gain some insights by looking at the derivative of the left hand side of (4) with respect to h:
An increase in h has three e¤ects. First of all, congestion increases, hence utility is lower (…rst addendum on the right-hand side of (A.1)). Second, for given tax rate, the cost paid by the hth individual is higher because his or her wealth is higher (second term on the right-hand side). Finally, for given income level, the tax rate is lower because the …xed cost C is divided among more members (third addendum in (A.1)).
The sign of (A.1) will be positive if and only if this last 'tax rate e¤ect' (positive) is stronger than the 'congestion' and 'taxable income' e¤ects (negative).
For h ! 0 the tax rate e¤ect prevails, hence it is optimal to increase the size of the group beyond 0. For h ! 1, on the other hand, two possibilities arise. The …rst, relatively uninteresting, is that the tax rate e¤ect still prevails over the others so that the only stable group is the whole population. The second possibility is that (A.1) evaluated at 1 is negative. In this case there will be two solutions to (4), h A and h B , where h A < h B . Of these, only h B is stable. In fact, if one increased in…nitesimally the size of the group to h A + " the participation constraint would still be met for the (h A + ")th individual. The latter would be strictly better o¤ by joining the group than by staying outside, hence group size would increase. This holds as long as h's net utility is above u, i.e. until the richest member is the second root of (4), h B :
In the text we concentrate only on the stable equilibrium and refer to h B simply as 
Therefore H cannot be a RA equilibrium. ¤
Proof of proposition 2
Let¸¸0 indicate the multiplier on the constraint (6), and ¹¸0 the multiplier on the constraint h 2 · 1: The …rst order conditions to the problem are given by
with complementary slackness.
Claim 1:
Either h 2 = 1, or¸> 0; or both.
Proof of Claim 1. By contradiction. Suppose h 2 < 1 and¸= 0, i.e. (3) is not binding for h 2 . Then the median member would be strictly better o¤ in the group
By continuity of the left hand side of (3), h 2 + " will have a net bene…t no lower than u and will accept to join the group. Therefore the initial group was not an equilibrium. Notice that, while in general it is di¢cult to establish uniqueness in case B, for case A there is a simple su¢cient condition. The partial derivative of (7) with respect to h 1 is in fact unambiguously negative when
; i.e. when the distribution of income is su¢ciently skewed to the right. Under this condition, if an equilibrium h ¤ 1 exists, it is unique.
Proof of proposition 3
The mass of members will be smaller than [0; h ¤ ] if and only if the individual who was the marginal member under fy i g -i.e. the h ¤ de…ned by (4)-will drop out when the distribution becomes fe y i g. In fact assumption (A5) and monotonicity of utility guarantee that if h ¤ does not participate, no j > h ¤ will. Consider the di¤erence between the left hand sides of (3) under the new and under the old distribution:
¤ was held at the reservation utility u under the initial distribution, for y i > 0; 8i, a necessary and su¢cient condition for h ¤ to stay out of the group is that the above expression is negative, i.e. that (11) holds. ¤
The impact of inequality under restricted access
For case A, where the initial group composition before the redistribution of income
, we can establish the following. Claim: An increase in inequality taking the form described in (A4)-(A6) will decrease participation if and only if
Proof. Follows from (7), observing that ¡u 0 (1 ¡ h 1 ) is monotone decreasing in h 1 .
Notice that under mild su¢cient conditions on the shape of the new income distribution, participation unambiguously decreases when e y (h ¤ 1 +1)=2 < y (h ¤ 1 +1)=2 ; i.e. when the original median income member is poorer under the new distribution. 34 That is the situation represented in Figure 2b . 34 The su¢cient condition is that, when evaluated at h ¤ 1 , @e y (h1+1)=2 =@h 1 < @y (h1+1)=2 =@h 1 : In fact when e y (h 1 +1)=2 < y (h 1 +1)=2 this guarantees that the right hand side of (A.6) is less than 1, while the left hand side is greater than one by construction.
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Appendix B (c) "Relatively poor": individuals who put themselves in a rank equal or below that assigned to them by the community; "Relatively rich": individuals who put themselves in a rank higher than that assigned to them by the community. 
